The main feature that distinguished the 2025 election from that of 2020 was not just the number of candidates, but mainly the expected appeal of each one of them. Out of eight candidates in the 2025 contest, only two, the incumbent Ersin Tatar and Tufan Erhürman, leader of the Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi) – CTP appeared capable of garnering a significant share of votes; prospects for the other six were grim, as none was expected to secure more than one percent of the vote. The 2020 election was different, as six of the eleven candidates had secured over 4% of the vote, with three of them exceeding 20%. Tufan Erhürman, was one of the three leading the poll, ranked third with 21.7%. Under the circumstances, some commentators foresaw a one-round contest in 2025, with either of the two major candidates winning more than 50% in the first round. What they failed to predict, however, was the magnitude of the victory for the winner.
Since his election in 2020, with the support and heavy interference by the Turkish government, Ersin Tatar adopted a hard line on the Cyprus Problem, advocating a two-state solution instead of the agreed bi-zonal bi-communal federation, very close relations or even full alignment with Turkey and support of policies of islamisation of the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkey is the only country that recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – TRNC, self-proclaimed in 1983 in the northern part of Cyprus and treats its leader as the President. Despite non-recognition, the winner of the election is the leader of the community, representing it in the negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. Along with a heavy military presence since the summer 1974, Turkey’s control has over time taken many other forms. The community’s economy is dependent on Ankara’s funding of the public sector, while various economic and other protocols of cooperation underline the important role and the place of Turkey across many sectors of Turkish Cypriot politics. In addition, other forms of interference took place, for example open attempts to impose on the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi) – UBP a leader that Ankara favoured; From as far back as 2012, this interference caused internal party troubles, which led to a succession of leaders, three of them since Tatar’s election in 2020.
In 2025, tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots took to the streets in demonstrations against a ruling on headscarves in schools, fearing it as a form of transposition of Islamic rules on the community. Although professing the Islamic faith, Turkish Cypriots have always been fond of their secularity. Conservative politicians also joined the demonstration, underlining that secularism enjoys broad support in society.
Ersin Tatar focused his campaign on his support for international recognition of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus – TRNC and in seeking a solution of two states in Cyprus instead of federation, which has been the agreed goal of negotiations since 1977. He claimed that a federation would lead to Turkish Cypriots losing their “land and flag”, portraying it as an existential threat to the community.
Tufan Erhürman, while avoiding any open confrontation with Turkey, stressed that the people would take the decision on a Cyprus solution, which should be in the framework of resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, including political equality. The latter should be a precondition for resuming negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side, which broke down in July 2017. Negotiations could resume provided also that the two sides agree on a timeline, excluding an open-ended procedure.
Despite the Cyprus Problem being a key campaign issue, relations with Turkey as noted above, economic problems with rising prices, affected also by a weak Turkish lira, which is the official currency, were also significant factors that decided the outcome.
The results proved opinion polls wrong, as they were predicting a neck-to-neck battle, with each having equal chances of winning. Erhürman’s landslide victory with a share of 62.8% was a huge surprise; this was also the largest score for a winner since 1990, when the community’s legacy leader Rauf Denktaş defeated the candidate supported by all opposition parties with 66.7% of the vote.
The other candidates, Kirdağ Arif Salih, Hasgüler Mehmet, Yazıcı Ibrahim, Gürlek Hüseyin, Zorba Osman and Boran Ahmet, gathered all together 1,45% of the vote.
Erhürman’s win was interpreted by media and analysts as the expression of the people’s support for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, namely a federal one. They saw the Cyprus Problem as the key factor that decided the election. However, the general negative climate, the stalemate since 2017 and the absence of any positive near future prospect, could not support such a connection. For sure, the Cyprus Problem remains a significant criterion in any leadership election; however, neither the circumstances nor the very high score of Erhürman could justify the view that it was the decisive factor. The main issue, the key factor that determined the vote was the defense of the community and its survival; it was a reaction to Turkey’s interferences and to the threats against its secularity, way of living and autonomy. Although, most Turkish Cypriots accept and acknowledge that they need Turkey’s support, they do not accept to be her subjects. This was also a position projected by Mustafa Akıncı, in 2020; he lost the election facing openly Ankara, which backed Ersin Tatar. In 2025, Erhürman was more cautious, taking care not to offend the motherland; however, the community’s reaction proved stronger, as people fought against a clear existential threat. This reaction neutralized the support Ankara and AKP officials provided on the ground to Tatar, by accompanying him in his electoral campaign, visiting villages and talking to the people in his favour.
Along with the above, large parts of the electorate reacted to Tatar’s submission to Turkey, but also his policies on the economy and other issues as well as his arrogant style. His stance was contrary to the vision the community had about itself.
A question emerges, namely, how could the above argument explain the high percentage Erhürman received from settlers from Turkey? In fact, with the exception of a group of communities exclusively inhabited by settlers, in all other groups where settlers are in equal numbers or are a majority over Turkish Cypriots, Erhürman received over 50%. Why?
We could see three reasons, access to these communities by the candidate, the message he delivered and prospects this message could open for settlers. Limited access and appeal to communities with settlers had been over the years the main feature of the relations between the Republican Turkish Party – CTP and settlers. Up to the year 2000, left wing parties could hardly gain together 10% of the settler vote, while they lacked the possibility to present candidates in local elections in settler communities. Things started changing after CTP became a partner in power, in the early 1990s, and, in 2003, the sum of the CTP and Peace and Democracy Movement (Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi – BDH) vote increased to 20% in exclusively settler communities. In 2005, when Mehmet Ali Talat won the election in the first round, he secured more than 30% and in 2015, Akıncı received 38% in settler communities. In 2025, CTP was in a much better position to access these communities, with Erhürman’s message “I will support your right to European citizenship” having a significant impact. The prospects that such a promise could open for this group of people could have won him their trust and vote as most of them live in ghettoed communities and are denied by the Greek Cypriot authorities of movement across the dividing line or acquiring a RoC passport. Erhurman offered a glimmer of hope.
A breakdown of the vote by group of communities, shows that Erhürman’s highest share, almost 70%, was in Nicosia town and traditional Turkish Cypriot communities (inhabited by Turkish Cypriots before 1974), with its lowest in exclusively settler communities (39,2%), the only group where Tatar won a majority of votes.